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DISCUSSION

Corruption Improves Efficiency:
An Erroneous Belief
Naved Ahmad
Institute of Business Administration, Karachi, Pakistan.

C

orruption plays a destructive role in the progress and development of any society1.
Countries around the globe are facing the problem of corruption, albeit in different
degrees. The topic of corruption received immense attention during the late 1990s
when a stream of systematic empirical studies emerged to examine its causes and
effects. Moreover, the debate on the beneficial and detrimental effects of corruption
gets central position in the empirical literature2.
One body of theoretical literature on the effects of corruption demonstrates that
corruption improves efficiency and leads to economic growth by avoiding cumbersome
and lengthy government procedures. Nathaniel H Leff (1964) in his article titled
“Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption” published in American
Behavioral Scientist, first gave this idea. He contends that if government errs in policy
formulation corruption might improve welfare by reducing some of these mistakes.
Others, confirming Leff’s contention, argue that society with rigid, over-centralized
and dishonest bureaucracy is better than the society with rigid, over-centralized and
honest bureaucracy3. Corruption money is also considered as speed money for avoiding
delays. To acquire public utilities in many less developed economies, one has to stand
in long queues. In this situation, bribe can be used to avoid such delays4.

The argument that corruption can contribute to economic growth when government
regulations are too rigid is questionable, however. With more discretionary powers,
public officials often raise firm’s costs by introducing unnecessary requirements in
order to extort bribe. Thus bribery instead of avoiding cumbersome regulations
increases administrative delays to lure more bribes. Paolo Mauro (1995), a Harvard
graduate, using subjective indices of corruption assembled by Business International
provides empirical evidence that corruption lowers investment and economic growth.
He finds that corruption lowers private investment and economic growth even in the
sub-sample of countries where bureaucratic regulations are very cumbersome. His
analysis, however, does not embrace diverse effects of various forms of corruption on
economic growth. He makes an implicit assumption that the effects of all types of
corruption on growth are identical.
Criticizing Mauro’s analysis, Andrew Wedeman (1997) of University of NebraskaLincoln analyzes the effects of corruption on growth by grouping corruption into three
categories: looting, rent scraping, and dividend collecting. Looting creates capital
1

See Alam (1990) for details
See Lambsdorff (1999) for a complete review of empirical literature
3
See Huntington (1968) for details
4
See Kaufmann and Wei (1999) for details
2
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outflow because of insecurity, whereas rent scraping distorts the allocation of capital
towards rent seeking sector. Contrary to both looting and rent scraping, dividend
collecting gives incentives to corrupt officials to encourage domestic enterprise to
invest and prosper in order to share their profits. The study concludes that the effect
of corruption on growth will depend on the method the corrupt monies are extracted
and how they are disposed.
Economists perceive that corruption always creates winners and losers; it is indeed
possible that losers are not visible, albeit. The taxonomy of winners and losers in terms
of their visibility in any corrupt deal provides six possible cases. First, winners are not
visible but losers are. Any ill-intentioned government regulations that are intended to
contrive bribes impose higher cost to the consumers who are visible. Second, both
winners and losers are not visible. This is the case where corruption is collusive in
nature. The above two cases best explain what Wedeman (1997) calls “Looting”.
Third, winners and losers are both visible. For example corruption in the procurement
of various government contracts where the officials who receive bribes and the one
who is awarded the contract are winners and all the remaining bidders are losers.
Fourth, winners are visible but losers are not. For example corruption in educational
institutions where students are involved in cheating by paying bribes to the concerned
persons or where examiners are awarding inflated grades to the students who are either
their relatives, friends, or private students. In this case the students and the examiners
who are involved in corruption are winners. Unfortunately this has inflicted heavy
losses to those innocent students who because of this corruption are unable to either
get jobs or obtain admissions of their choice on merit. They are the losers but are not
visible. This type of corruption compels students to waste their energy to acquire
either private tuition or find someone who can help them steal the required grades.
In the jargon of economics we call it rent seeking activity. The third and fourth cases
best explain what Wedeman (1997) calls “rent scraping”. One can easily furnish
numerous examples for the above four cases. However, it is not possible, I surmise,
for any corrupt dealings that do not create winners.
The last case that is often neglected highlights a situation where corruption does not
leave any victims or losers. This last case is akin to the “dividend-collecting” concept
noted by Wedeman (1997). People who are involved in petty corruption in less
developed countries often support Leff’s argument making a case that their act does
not hurt anyone. In other words, it is possible for a person to pay bribes for his or her
own legal work that does not impose any cost to others. And therefore it is Pareto
efficient. This type of bribery is often used to illicitly counteract other forms of
corruption. For example, if one wants to get his/her passport that is legal but the
system is such that one has to grease the palms of the officials to avoid unnecessary
delays, many people often believe that there is no harm greasing their palms. This
example can also be applied to the efficiency wage model where wages determine the
efficiency of the workers. By analogy bribe can also be used as a backhander for the
public officials to work efficiently. For example when people are coerced to bribe the
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officials in order to avoid delays for their legal work, it might increase overall efficiency
for the following three reasons: a) people get timely and efficient services without
delays; b) the officials will have the money (bribe); and c) it does not hurt others. The
above arguments make Leff’s contention logical.
There is a wide consensus among economists about the detrimental effects of corruption
on economic growth particularly if it creates losers. However, the paucity of data on the
amount of bribery primarily asked for legal work has constrained researchers to establish
an empirical relationship between bribery and government efficiency. Nevertheless,
corruption no matter whether it leaves victims or not is undesirable. Accepting bribes
whether for doing legal or illegal work is unethical, immoral and disgusting act; and
therefore should be abated. To abate corruption even if it leaves no victims, we have to
edify our coming generations about the evilness of corruption and at the same time empower
the victims of corruption by teaching them ethics. One important policy prescription that
can be derived from this analysis is that government should not impose excessive regulations
in the hope that some of these regulations can be avoided through bribery.
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It is one thing to tell the truth even when it damages your friends. It’s another to
tell untruths in order not to offend your enemies.
Clifford D. May, President
Foundation for the Defense of Democracies
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